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Comment
Jose´ M. Bernardo
The authors provide an authoritative lecture guide
of Theory of Probability, where they clearly state
that the more useful material today is that con-
tained in Chapters 3 and 5, which respectively deal
with estimation, and hypothesis testing. We argue
that, from a contemporary viewpoint, the impact of
Jeffreys proposals on those two problems is rather
different, and we describe what we perceive to be the
state of the question nowadays, suggesting that Jef-
freys’s dramatically different treatment is not nec-
essary, and that a joint objective approach to those
two problems is indeed possible.
1. INTRODUCTION
As the authors point out, Theory of Probability
is an indispensable, if often difficult to navigate,
Bayesian foundational text. Their authoritative lec-
ture guide is therefore very welcome. As should be
clear from their review, the main useful material to-
day is contained in Chapters 3 and 5 which, respec-
tively, deal with estimation, in the sense of deriving
an objective posterior distribution for the quantity
of interest, and hypothesis testing, presented as a
derivation of an objective posterior probability for
the hypothesis under consideration. I believe that,
from a contemporary viewpoint, the impact of Jef-
freys proposals on those two problems is rather dif-
ferent, as I now briefly try to describe.
2. ESTIMATION
One-parameter Jeffreys estimation prior (Jeffreys
rule). Following his own pioneering work (Jeffreys,
1946), the book introduces in Section 3.10 what it is
now considered the main meaning of the confusing
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denomination “Jeffreys prior.” Thus, to obtain an
objective posterior density for the parameter α of
a probability model f(x|α), he proposes the formal
use in Bayes theorem of the (often improper) prior
pi(α) ∝ |I(α)|1/2, where I(α) is Fisher information
function. As the authors point out, Jeffreys’s mo-
tivation is rather obscure: he describes I(α) as a
second order approximation to two functional dis-
tances, and notes that |I(α)|1/2 happens to be in-
variant under one-to-one transformations. No trace
of its more intuitive interpretation in terms of the
prior which assigns equal probabilities to equally
distinguishable subregions of the parameter space
(Lindley, 1961). Also, even in its third (1961) edi-
tion, the book only gives a cursory reference to the
independent, essentially simultaneous, derivation of
the same “rule” produced by Perks (1947) in a much
underrated paper. That said, Jeffreys (or Jeffreys–
Perks) rule is today the objective prior of choice
for regular problems with one continuous parameter,
and has been justified in this simple case from many
different viewpoints, including coverage properties
(Welch and Peers, 1963), minimum bias (Hartigan,
1965), data translation (Box and Tiao, 1973) and
information-theoretical arguments (Bernardo, 1979;
Berger, Bernardo and Sun, 2009). In one-parameter
problems, Jeffreys left without solution non-regular
models (e.g., those where the sampling space de-
pends on the parameter) and models with a discrete
parameter (although he suggested a very interesting
hierarchical argument to deal with the particular ex-
ample of the hypergeometric distribution).
Many-parameter Jeffreys estimation prior (mul-
tiparameter Jeffreys rule). The arguments used to
propose his rule for one continuous parameter regu-
lar models extend to the corresponding multiparam-
eter case, leading to pi(α) ∝ |I(α)|1/2, where I(α)
is now Fisher information matrix. As the authors
point out in their review, Jeffreys immediately re-
alized, however, that his multivariate rule does not
generally produce sensible answers and suggested ad
hoc alternatives in virtually all the multiparameter
examples he analyzed, leading to a plethora of “Jef-
freys priors” in the sense that they were proposed
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by him, although they do not follow from his gen-
eral rule. Moreover, as all Bayesians in his time,
Jeffreys was working under the assumption that a
unique objective prior would be appropriate for all
inference problems within a multiparameter model.
Stein (1959) paradox already suggested that this
could not possibly be true, but it was the discov-
ery of the marginalization paradoxes (Dawid, Stone
and Zidek, 1973) what definitely established this as
a fact, while the reference priors (Bernardo, 1979)
provided the first solution to the problem thus cre-
ated.
Proper posteriors. Scholars have been often sur-
prised at the fact that, when applicable, Jeffreys rule
priors (ever in their multiparameter version) typi-
cally produce proper posteriors for all data sets, a
condition one should certainly require for any pro-
posal of an objective prior to be permissible. I won-
der if the authors have an explanation for this re-
markable fact (shared by reference priors). Curi-
ously, as noted by the authors, Jeffreys uses in his
analysis of the Poisson model the prior pi(α) ∝ 1/α
on an scale invariant argument, only to mention
later that it is the Jeffreys-rule prior, pi(α)∝ 1/√α,
the one leading to a proper posterior for all possible
data sets.
3. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Jeffreys hypothesis testing priors. In Chapter 5,
Jeffreys focuses on precise hypothesis testing and,
as the present review indicates, does not produce
a solution with the level of acceptance and gener-
ality of his one-parameter rule for estimation. Jef-
freys intends to obtain a posterior probability for a
precise null hypothesis and, to do this, he is forced
to use a mixed prior which puts a lump of prob-
ability p = Pr(H0) on the null, say H0 ≡ {θ = θ0},
and distributes the rest with a proper prior p(θ)
(he mostly chooses p= 1/2). This has a very upset-
ting consequence, usually known as Lindley’s para-
dox (Lindley, 1957): for any fixed prior probability p
independent of the sample sixe n, the procedure will
wrongly accept H0 whenever the likelihood is con-
centrated around a true parameter value which lies
O(n−1/2) from H0. I find it difficult to accept a pro-
cedure which is known to produce the wrong answer
under specific, but not controllable, circumstances;
see Robert (1993) for a relatively recent review of
this fascinating issue. Besides this, I believe, serious
problem, Jeffreys suggestion of a Cauchy density for
the required proper prior is rather ad hoc and does
not generalize to more complicated problems. There
have been many attempts to define priors intended
to obtain objective posterior probabilities for precise
nulls. To the best of my knowledge, none of those has
emerged as a clearly acceptable general solution.
Hypothesis testing with conventional reference pri-
ors. To test whether or not a precise hypothesis H0
is compatible with observed data, it is not necessary
to try to obtain a posterior probability for H0, and
hence it it not necessary to use a totally different
type of objective prior than that used for estima-
tion. As forcefully argued by Jaynes (1980), all that
is required is to obtain the posterior distribution of
a quantity which measures the discrepancy between
the true model and the null model. A very attractive
candidate is the intrinsic discrepancy. The intrinsic
discrepancy between two probability distributions
p1 and p2 for x is defined as
δ{p1, p2}=min[κ{p1|p2}, κ{p2|p1}],
where κ{pj |pi} =
∫
Xi
pi(x) log[pi(x)/pj(x)]dx, the
Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence of pj from pi. This
inherits all the very nice properties of the KL di-
vergence (non-negative, invariant, additive) but is
also symmetric and it is defined even if the sup-
ports of the two distributions are strictly nested.
For instance, in the canonical example of testing
whether a random sample x = {x1, . . . , xn} from a
normal N(x|µ,σ) is or is not compatible with the
mean value µ0, one obtains
δ{µ0, (µ,σ)}= δ{N(x|µ0, σ),N(x|µ,σ)}
=
1
2
(
µ− µ0
σ/
√
n
)2
.
If σ is known, the objective posterior distribution of
δ{µ0, (µ,σ)} with the usual objective prior pi(µ) = 1
gives all required information about whether or not
the null H0 ≡ {µ= µ0} should be accepted, includ-
ing the size of the plausible departures. If a formal
decision is required, δ{µ0, (µ,σ)} may be used as a
loss function (it is an intrinsic loss in the sense of
Robert, 1996). In this case, one simply computes its
expected value, which is the intrinsic test statistic
d(µ0|x) = 1
2
(1 + z2), z =
x¯− µ0
σ/
√
n
,
and rejects the null if this is too large (say larger
than log[100] since this would imply that the data
are expected to be over 100 times more likely un-
der the true model than under the null model). See
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for the general definition when there are nuisance
parameters, and for many specific examples. One
could certainly use other continuous loss functions
but the point is, Bayesian testing of precise nulls do
not necessarily require the use of mixed priors as
those suggested by Jeffreys for this problems, and
this has the nontrivial merit of being able to use for
both estimation and hypothesis testing problems a
single, unified theory for the derivation of objective
“reference” priors.
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